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NOTES
The Mootness Doctrine in Class Actions: United States
Parole Commission v. Geraghty
John M. Geraghty was sentenced to five years in prison for conspiracy to
commit extortion and for the making of false material declarations to a
grand jury.' After his sentence was reduced to thirty months, Geraghty
applied for parole, but was refused. Under the Parole Release Guidelines 2
Geraghty would not have been eligible for parole until he had served his
entire sentence, reduced by good-time credits. Geraghty brought suit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the Parole Release Guidelines and peti-
tioned for certification of a class of all federal prisoners who were or who
would become eligible for release on parole.3 The district court denied
Geraghty's petition for certification and granted the Commission's cross
motion for summary judgment on the merits.4 Geraghty appealed both
rulings,5 but while his appeal was pending, he completed his sentence and
was released from prison. The United States Parole Commission moved to
dismiss the appeal as moot. The court of appeals ruled, however, that class
certification had been erroneously denied, and that mootness of the plain-
tiff's claim did not bar further adjudication. 6 Finding that summary judg-
ment had been improvidently granted, the appellate court remanded the
case for further consideration. 7 The district court stayed the proceedings
following the United States Supreme Court's grant of certiorari. Held, Pa-
1. Geraghty's conviction was affirmed in United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
2. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979). The United States Parole Board adopted these guidelines
in 1973. They provide for the formulation of a customary release date for each prisoner
based on the combination of a parole prognosis score and an offense severity rating.
3. Geraghty originally filed suit against the United States Parole Commission and
others and sought certification as a class action in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. The court transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania
where Geraghty was in custody. Geraghty alleged that the Parole Release Guidelines were
unconstitutional because they allowed the Parole Commissioner to make deferred sentenc-
ing decisions without due process and because they violated the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. The petitioner claimed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976)
(habeas corpus statute), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976) (Administrative Procedure Act), and 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (federal question jurisdiction).
4. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 429 F. Supp. 737 (M.D. Pa. 1977). Ac-
cording to the court, FED. R. Civ. P. 23, governing class actions, applied to Geraghty's claim
only by analogy. Finding that the action was in the form of a writ of habeas corpus, the
court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief and that a class action
was neither necessary, because affected prisoners could bring individual writs of habeas
corpus, nor appropriate, because some prisoners might oppose changes in parole guidelines.
429 F. Supp. at 739-41.
Geraghty was brought as a § 23(b)(2) action, which requires the appropriateness of final
injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
5. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978).
6. Id. at 252-54.
7. The court of appeals found that the district court erred in regarding the claim solely
as a writ of habeas corpus because declaratory relief was appropriate under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-
706 (1976) and 18 U.S.C. § 4218(c) (1976). 579 F.2d at 243. The court held that the errone-
ous denial of a certifiable class did not necessitate an end to the litigation even though the
named representative's claim had expired. In addition, the court noted that the possibility of
conflicting interests within the class could be reconciled through the use of subclasses. The
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cated and remanded: Despite the mooting of a named plaintiffs individual
claim on the merits after denial of class certification, the action is not
moot. The named plaintiff may be a proper representative for purposes of
appealing the denial of class certification when he maintains a personal
stake in obtaining class certification sufficient to satisfy article III require-
ments. United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. 1202, 63 L.
Ed. 2d 479 (1980).
I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE
IN CLASS ACTIONS
Article III of the Constitution restricts the exercise of federal judicial
power to "cases" or "controversies."' 8 This constitutional limitation re-
quires a real and substantial controversy capable of conclusive judicial re-
lief9 and the presence of litigants with a sufficient personal stake I0 in the
outcome of the case to assure the presentation of concrete issues in an ad-
versary setting. " I When a live controversy ceases to exist or the parties lose
a legally cognizable interest in its outcome,' 2 the federal courts, under the
mootness doctrine, no longer have the power to decide the issue. 13
In some instances, however, the Court allows an individual's own action
to survive, despite the party's loss of a personal stake in the merits of the
case, if the claim itself is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."' 4
The Supreme Court has applied this traditional mootness exception to
class actions, focusing by analogy on the impracticality and injustice of
court, therefore, reversed the district court and ordered it to consider the use of subclasses
sua sponte. Id. at 248-54.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, the Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority . . . to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-[and] to Controversies between two or more
States ....
For a discussion of the development of the case or controversy requirement from a common
law doctrine to a constitutional mandate, see Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 374-79 (1974).
9. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
10. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
11. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
12. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).
13. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937). The doctrine of justiciability is a blend of constitu-
tional requirements and policy considerations, making it a doctrine of "uncertain and shift-
ing contours." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968). Justiciability limits the business of
courts to questions presented in an adversary context in cases capable of resolution, and
assures effective separation of powers among branches of government. Id. at 94-97. See
generally L. TRINE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52-114 (1978). Because the mootness
doctrine is rooted in the constitutional requirements of article III, a federal court "is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions." California v. San Pablo &
Tulare R.R., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893). See also United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S.
113, 116 (1920).
14. The Supreme Court recognized the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doc-
trine in Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911), in which the plaintiffs
sought review of an ICC order, but the order expired before the case reached the Supreme
Court.
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depriving an individual plaintiff of legal recourse when he may again be
subjected to the same injury. 15 Consideration of these factors is appropri-
ate in class suits because although the expiration of the named plaintiffs
claim may not lead to repetition as to him, it does not eliminate a continu-
ing repetition and controversy as to remaining members. 16 The applica-
tion of mootness principles in class actions, however, has caused
considerable debate over whether the existence of a certified class or po-
tential class should make a difference in how far to extend the exception. '
7
Prior to 1975 the Supreme Court had not directly addressed the question
of whether a class action would be moot if there were no demonstrated
probability of repeated injury to the class representative whose substantive
claim expired before a final determination on the merits.' 8 In Sosna v.
Iowa'9 the Court held that the expiration of the named plaintiffs claim
after certification of a class does not moot the action.20 Sosna successfully
petitioned the federal district court for class certification of all Iowa resi-
dents unable to initiate divorce or separation actions because of a one-year
residency requirement. After a three-judge federal court denied relief on
the merits, Sosna appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Before the ap-
peal could be heard, however, Sosna fulfilled the Iowa residency require-
ment and secured a divorce. The Court relied on two lines of reasoning in
ruling that the case was not moot. First, because Sosna originally had ap-
proached the district court in a representative capacity, the Court found
that upon certification by the district court the class had acquired a distinct
15. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-11 n.lI (1975) (pretrial detention);
Super Tire Eng'r Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974) (welfare benefits); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (state voter residency
requirement). For a discussion of the capable of repetition doctrine and group interests, see
Note, supra note 8, at 386-88.
16. Avoiding a multiplicity of suits has motivated development of the procedural device
of a class action. See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02[l] (2d ed. 1978); 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533, at 265
(1975) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Further, the court in McGuire v. Roebuck,
347 F. Supp. 1111, 1125 (E.D. Tex. 1972), explained that the possibility of rendering deci-
sions that have become academic is less likely in class actions, and therefore, the reasoning
ascribed to the mootness doctrine does not necessarily apply.
17. See, e.g., 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 1085-1092a (1977);
Kane, Standing, Mootness and Federal Rule 23-Balancing Perspectives, 26 BUFFALO L.
REV. 83 (1976-1977); Developments in the Law--ClassActions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1463-
71 (1976); Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of
the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573; Comment, 4 Searchfor Principles of Mootness
in the Federal Courts- Part Two--Class Actions, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 1320 (1976); Note, supra
note 8; Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672 (1970).
18. See Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973) (per curiam)
(remanded on question of mootness after named plaintiff's claim expired). Perhaps the ear-
liest suggestion that an action might continue after dismissal of the named plaintiff came in
Justice Marshall's concurrence to Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 409 U.S. 75, 79
(1972). The case was remanded for mootness determination, but Justice Marshall stated that
"[e]ven if the case is now moot as to these particular petitioners, there may be other mem-
bers of the class who remain aggrieved and thus the action may remain a viable one." Id. at
79 n.7.
19. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
20. Id. at 402.
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legal status.2' This factor, the Court concluded, significantly affected the
mootness determination. 22 Secondly, the Court recognized that although
the possibility of repeated future claims by Sosna was unlikely, the state
would continue to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional statute against
unnamed class members. 23 While Sosna implied that timely certification
was required to avoid mootness in a class action,24 the Court alluded to the
possibility that a claim might be so inherently transitory that no one plain-
tiff could sustain a personal stake long enough for a district court to rule on
certification. 25 In such instances, the Court suggested, the certification
might relate back to the filing of the complaint.26
Later that same year, the Supreme Court addressed this contingency in
footnote eleven of Gerstein v. Pugh.27 In Gerstein a class action was filed
on behalf of all persons subject to pretrial detention. Before the class
could be certified, however, the named plaintiffs were convicted. The
Supreme Court concluded that the claim was capable of repetition yet
evading review.28 Applying the principles of Sosna, the Court held that
the loss of the named plaintiffs' claims on the merits did not render the
action moot.29 The Court justified the absence of Sosna's implied require-
ment of a named plaintiff with a substantive claim at the time of certifica-
tion by reference to the relation back theory.30 The inherently transitory
nature of pretrial detention and the possible injury to other persons simi-
larly situated, the Court reasoned, were factors meriting an exception to
timely certification. 3 l
In other cases, however, the Court drew the line differently, showing less
concern for unnamed parties and favoring a strict construction of the live
controversy requirement in relation to the class representatives. 32 In Board
2 I. ld. at 399.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 400. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972), the Court had
previously applied the capable of repetition doctrine to persons other than the named plain-
tiff.
24. The Sosna Court stressed both the grant of certification and a controversy capable
of repetition as prerequisites to avoiding mootness. 419 U.S. at 402. The second require-
ment was weakened in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), in which the
Court found that identifying a situation repetitiously evading review was not required to
establish a live controversy and functional adversity. Id. at 754. Moreover, the Court im-
plied that timely certification could be an independent ground for avoiding mootness of a
class action. Id. at 753-57.
25. 419 U.S. at 402 n.l1.
26. Id.




31. Id. Following Gerstein a number of courts allowed certification on a "relation
back" theory. See, e.g., Basel v. Knebel, 551 F.2d 395, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Zurak v. Regan,
550 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d
163 (3d Cir. 1976).
32. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), involved a petition for
injunctive relief from allegedly unconstitutional segregation of public schools in Pasadena.
The trial court ordered the school board to adopt desegregation plans. Successors to the
action sought modification of the order and the Court noted that, because of the graduation
1026 [Vol. 34
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of School Commissioners v. Jacobs,33 decided later in the same term, six
high school students brought a class action challenging allegedly unconsti-
tutional interference with student publications. The students won on the
merits, but in retrospect the Court found that the judgment did not ade-
quately include other class members. By the time school officials appealed
the decision, all six students had graduated. The Court held that the ac-
tion was moot "[b]ecause the class action was never properly certified nor
the class properly identified by the District Court."'34
In the aftermath of Sosna, Gerstein, and Jacobs the guidelines for avoid-
ing mootness raised some subtle questions. While Gerstein and Sosna had
established class action exceptions to the mootness doctrine by employing
equitable principles traditionally applicable to individual actions and by
judicially creating the concept of the legal status of the certified class, the
implications remained uncertain when the timing and correctness of the
decisions on class certification could be put in issue. By granting certiorari
in United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, the Supreme Court as-
sumed the task of refining the answers to some of these subtle questions.
II. UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION v. GERAGHTY
In United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty the Supreme Court held
that an action brought on behalf of a class does not become moot upon
expiration of the named plaintiffs substantive claim even though class cer-
tification has been denied. The Court further held that the named plaintiff
in this instance was a proper representative for purposes of appealing the
denial of certification.35 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, 36 con-
ceded that prior decisions of the Court did not necessarily mandate a rul-
ing that the action was not moot.37 The majority noted, however, that
earlier decisions concerning mootness in class actions had relaxed the tra-
of students involved, the case would have been moot had the United States not been a
suitable party for intervention. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (per curiam),
concerned a class challenge to state parole procedures. The district court refused to certify
the class and denied relief on the merits. On appeal, the derision was reversed with no
mention of the class suit. Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974). After state
parole officials successfully petitioned for writ of certiorari, Weinstein v. Bradford, 421 U.S.
998 (1975), the proposed representative himself suggested that the action was moot because
he had been released from prison, and the Court agreed. 423 U.S. at 147-48.
33. 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 130.
35. 100 S. Ct. at 1212, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 495. The Court's holding extended only to the
appeal of a denial of class certification. No decision was made on whether a certifiable class
existed or whether Geraghty would be the proper representative for an appeal on the merits.
As the Court noted, denial of class certification for a second time would end the litigation.
Id. Additionally, the Court made clear that it was not addressing the question of whether
an action would become moot when a named plaintiff settles his individual claim after de-
nial of certification. Id. at 1212 n.10, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 495 n.10. Finally, the Court held that
although the court of appeals could properly instruct the district court to consider subclasses
sua sponte because the plaintiff had had no opportunity to do so at trial, the burden would
be on the plaintiff to construct the subclasses. Id. at 1214, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 498.
36. Justice Blackmun was joined in the majority by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Stevens.
37. 100 S. Ct. at 1212-14 n.ll, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 496-97 n.ll.
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ditionally rigid contours of article III through a consideration of the practi-
cal and prudential implications of each case.38 Examining the particular
facts surrounding Geraghty's motion for certification, 39 the Court found
that the proposed representative maintained a personal stake in obtaining
certification sufficient to avoid compromising article III principles.4°
While noting that the facts in Geraghty were unprecedented, the Court
stated that its holding did not represent a significant departure from estab-
lished mootness principles.4' In order to demonstrate that the loss of the
proposed class representative's personal stake does not automatically moot
the action, the Court examined the exceptions to the mootness doctrine,
reviewing those decisions that recognized the capable of repetition yet
evading review doctrine. 42 The Court explained that the possibility of fu-
ture claims arising as to the same plaintiff assures vigorous advocacy. 43
The Court further recognized that even if there is no chance of repetition
as to a named plaintiff, certification alone is an effective means of avoiding
mootness.44 Finally, the Court discussed Gerstein v. Pugh45 as representa-
tive of the narrow class of cases in which a claim is so inherently transitory
that it is unlikely any named plaintiff will sustain a claim long enough for
a court to rule on certification. 46 In such instances, the Court concluded, a
relation back theory is appropriate. 47
The Court also relied on a series of decisions providing that a certifica-
38. Id. The Court discussed in a footnote its perception of mootness in nontraditional
litigation. According to the Court, an intelligible pattern was difficult to perceive, but the
lack of consistency had been compensated for through a cautious approach to the underly-
ing purposes of the case or controversy requirement. Unwilling to speculate how far the
Court would proceed in its adaptation of the mootness doctrine to class suits, the majority
insisted that Geraghty in no way approached the dissent's fear of bystander litigation. Id.
39. For a similar approach, see Kuahulu v. Employers Ins., 557 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.
1977), in which the court stated that application of the mootness doctrine in class actions "to
a large extent, depends on the idiosyncrasies of each case." Id. at 1337.
40. 100 S. Ct. at 1212, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 495. The Court explained that the elements of a
live controversy continued to exist with regard to the certification issue. See text accompa-
nying notes 63-64 infra.
41. 100 S. Ct. at 1212 n.ll, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 496 n.li.
42. Id. at 1209-10, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 491-92.
43. Id. at 1209, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 492.
44. Id. The Court interpreted Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), as
clearly establishing timely certification as an independent means of avoiding mootness. 100
S. Ct. at 1209, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 492; see note 24 supra and accompanying text. The court of
appeals had suggested that certifiability of a class, rather than actual certification, should
control. 579 F.2d at 249 n.43. This reasoning is persuasive because prior to certification a
suit is treated as a class action for certain limited purposes, such as consideration of dismis-
sal or settlement. See Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853, 855 (4th Cir. 1973); Gaddis v. Wy-
man, 304 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
45. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
46. 100 S. Ct. at 1209-10, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 492.
47. Id. at 1209, 1212-14 n.ll, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 491, 496-97 n.li. The Court gave two
indications that its decision was particularly dependent on Gerstein. First, the Court stated
that "[tihe interest of the named plaintiff in Gerstein was precisely the same as that of Ger-
aghty here." Id. at 1210, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 493. Secondly, the Court stated in a footnote: "We
merely hold that when a District Court erroneously denies a procedural motion . . . an
appeal lies from the denial and the corrected ruling 'relates back' to the date of the original
denial." 1d. at 1212-13 n.ll, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 496-97 n.l1.
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tion denial could be appealed after final judgment on the merits, despite a
resolution of the named litigant's substantive claims. 48 In United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald9 the Court allowed an unnamed plaintiff to intervene in
order to appeal a denial of class certification after the named plaintiff had
prevailed on the merits. The Court ruled that the motion to intervene was
timely because it had been filed within the time allowable for an appeal of
the certification denial by the named plaintiffs.50 In reaching this decision
the Court stated that the "refusal to certify was subject to appellate review
after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs." 5' In Coopers v.
Lybrand52 the Court based its rejection of interlocutory appeals from deni-
als of class certification largely on the availability of appeal after judgment
on the merits.53 Finally, in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 54 a
decision entered the same day as Geraghty, the Court allowed the named
plaintiffs to appeal the denial of class certification after a judgment was
entered in their favor.55 In Geraghty the Court stated that the expiration
of a plaintiffs substantive claim rather than a judgment on the merits does
not affect the plaintiffs personal stake in the certification issue and should
not be an acceptable basis for distinction. 56
Reluctant to rely exclusively on any given precedent,57 the Court then
shifted its focus to the constitutional requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome of the litigation to support its conclusion that the action was not
moot. 58 Reasoning that a named representative presents two separate is-
sues for judicial determination, the claim on the merits and the claim that
48. Id. at 1210, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 492-93.
49. 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
50. Id. at 396.
51. Id. at 393.
52. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
53. Id. at 469, 470 n.15.
54. 100 S. Ct. 1166, 63 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1980).
55. Id. at 1174-75, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 431.
56. 100 S. Ct. at 1211, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 493-94. The majority in Geraghty did not find its
ruling inconsistent with Roper, but a realignment of the members of the Court in the two
cases suggests otherwise. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court in Roper,
joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justices Rehnquist
and Stevens filed concurring opinions and Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Stewart joined. For
the division of the Court in Geraghty, see note 36 supra and note 65 infra. At least some
members of the Roper Court apparently based their decision on the named plaintiffs' sus-
tained interest in a collateral matter. The named representatives maintained that they had
an economic interest in sharing litigation costs with the class. Personal stake in such collat-
eral matters had previously been recognized in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)
(economic interest in back pay).
57. 100 S. Ct. at 1212 n. 11, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 496 n.I I. Arguably, the Court could not rely
exclusively on Sosna because of Geraghty's inability to have a class certified prior to extinc-
tion of his claim; it could not depend entirely on Gerstein because the ability to obtain a
ruling on certification showed that Geraghty's claim was not inherently transitory; it could
not strictly follow the traditional capable of repetition cases because, unless certification had
been approved, these decisions customarily required a demonstrated probability of future
injury to the same plaintiff; and Roper is distinguishable because mootness was caused by a
judgment on the merits and the named plaintiffs maintained an economic interest in appeal-
ing the denial of certification.
58. Id. at 1211-12, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 494-95.
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he is entitled to represent a class, the Court stated that the certification
question exists independently of a substantive resolution.59 Although it
acknowledged that the identification of a procedural claim as a "legally
cognizable interest" has been rare,60 the Court stated that a named plain-
tiff who approaches the court in a representative capacity deserves judicial
resolution of his certification claim.61 The Court reasoned that achieving
the primary benefits of the class action device necessitates a right to have a
class certified if the stipulated prerequisites are fulfilled. 62 Despite the ex-
piration of the named plaintiffs claim, the Court held that the certification
question remained a concrete, sharply presented issue capable of judicial
resolution.63 Geraghty's continued insistence that the certification decision
be reviewed, the Court concluded, satisfied the functional adversity re-
quirement of article 111.64
The dissent, led by Justice Powell,65 criticized the majority's unwilling-
ness to effectuate "self-imposed restraints on the exercise of judicial
power."'66 According to Justice Powell, the cases cited by the majority did
not support recognition of a flexible approach to mootness in class ac-
tions.67 Distinguishing both Sosna and Roper,68 the dissent maintained
that the majority had taken an unprecedented move toward allowing prac-
59. Id. at 1211, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 494. One commentator has stated, that because of the
unique context of mootness in class actions, "the Court's willingness to consider quite specu-
lative allegations of injury to personal interests seems appropriate." Note, supra note 8, at
386.
60. 100 S. Ct. at 1211, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 494 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
496 (1969)).
61. Id. at 1212, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 495.
62. Id. The Court qualified its pronouncement of a right to certification by noting that
the right was more analogous to the private attorney general concept than to the traditional
personal injury requirement of article II. Id. For a discussion of the private attorney gen-
eral concept, see 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.05 (1958). Geraghty
sought to have his action certified as a 23(b)(2) class action. For a discussion of the prereq-
uisites of a 23(b)(2) class suit, see note 4 supra. Class suits for injunctive relief have typically
involved redress of civil and constitutional rights. See generaly 7A WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 16, § 1776. The private attorney general concept is not unfamiliar in these ac-
tions. As one commentator noted, 23(b)(2) actions involve issues of public policy that typi-
cally maintain the interest of a named plaintiff even when his or her personal claim has
expired. This is a persuasive factor when considering the adequacy of a plaintiff to represent
the class. See Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismis-
sal of the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573, 587.
63. 100 S. Ct. at 1212, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 495.
64. Id.
65. Justice Powell was joined in dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist.
66. 100 S. Ct. at 1215, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 499.
67. Id. at 1216, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 501. The dissent was particularly troubled by the major-
ity's relegation of Weinstein, Jacobs, and Spangler to a single footnote. In each of these
cases, appeal was brought by the defendants on the merits prior to any attempt to appeal the
certification order. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
68. 100 S. Ct. at 1218, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 502-03. The dissent distinguished Sosna on the
ground that it was limited to the recognition that certification gives a class legal recognition.
Id. The dissent dismissed any analogy to Roper by stating that the named plaintiffs in that
case had an alleged economic interest in appealing the denial of certification, whereas Ger-
aghty had denied any personal interest in the outcome of his appeal. Id. at 1219, 63 L. Ed.
2d at 504.
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tical considerations to govern judicial discretion.6 9 The dissent argued that
the majority had redefined the personal stake requirement of article III by
premising jurisdiction on the "bare existence of a sharply presented issue
in a concrete and vigorously argued case."' 70 Unwilling to approve of the
majority's reliance on the procedural device of certification as supplying
the personal stake requirement, the dissent concluded that the Court's re-
definition of that requirement left no justification for its otherwise
steadfast refusal to allow "public actions."' 7' The dissent also argued that
the Court's recognition of a right to certification violated the mandate 72
that no rule of procedure may enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 73 Finally, while sympathetic to the fate of class actions, the dissent
stressed that article III offered no exceptions for nontraditional litigation.7
4
III. CONCLUSION
In United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty the Court held that de-
spite the expiration of a named plaintiffs claim after denial of class certifi-
cation, the action is not moot. The Court further held that a named
plaintiff who maintains a personal stake in obtaining certification sufficient
to satisfy article III requirements may be a proper representative for pur-
poses of appealing the denial. The Court ruled that such a denial should
be appealable whether the mootness issue arises due to a determination on
the merits or an expiration of the named plaintiffs substantive claim
through occurrences other than a final judgment. In traditional nonprivate
attorney general litigation the judiciary must guard against rendering deci-
sions that will have no effective application. In a class action seeking in-
junctive relief, as opposed to compensatory damages, the appropriateness
of judicial intervention must be measured by different standards. Potential
unnamed plaintiffs remain in the background, and matters of important
public constitutional litigation are at issue. The Geraghty decision demon-
strates the Court's concern for achieving the primary benefits of class ac-
tions and its recognition that public interest litigation demands a
reevaluation of the mootness doctrine. The dissent may be correct in not-
ing that the Court's decision allows continuation of a suit with no plaintiff,
but this is but an acknowledgment of the fiction that has evolved to accom-
modate the differences between individual and class action litigation.
Forcing Geraghty into the foreground, the Court continues the fiction.
The Court's attempt to satisfy the constitutional requirements of article III
through recognition of an independent right to certification, however, may
leave the decision resting precariously upon its particular facts. Still, Ger-
aghty's viability may be assured through the Court's acknowledgment that
69. Id. at 1216, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 500.
70. Id. at 1222, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 507.
71. Id.
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
73. 100 S. Ct. at 1221, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 506.
74. Id. at 1217, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 501.
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